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THE MEANING OF FAIR APPORTIONMENT
AND THE PROHIBITION ON
EXTRATERRITORIAL STATE TAXATION
Bradley W. Joondeph*
INTRODUCTION

The constitutional requirement that state and local taxes be "fairly
apportioned" is a longstanding and well-accepted element of the
Supreme Court's state tax jurisprudence.' As early as the late 1800s,
the Court indicated that state taxes on interstate commerce must be
apportioned to reflect the taxpayer's activities in the taxing
jurisdiction.2 And although the Court's state tax decisions over the
past century have hardly followed a consistent or logical path,3 the fair
apportionment test has remained a central component of the Court's
doctrinal framework. Today, fair apportionment is a distinct element
of the Court's four-part test, first articulated in Complete Auto
Transit, Inc. v. Brady' (and now known as the "Complete Auto test"),
for assessing state taxes under the dormant Commerce Clause. And
the Court has found in several cases that state taxes that were not

* Associate Professor, Santa Clara University School of Law. I owe thanks to June
Carbone, Peter Faber, Walter Hellerstein, Jeff Kahn, Richard Primus, Srija
Srinivasan, Nancy Staudt, John Swain, and Peter Wiedenbeck for their generous and
helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article. Thanks also to the students in my
state and local tax classes for their many contributions to my thinking on these issues.
1. See Walter Hellerstein, Is "Internal Consistency" Foolish?: Reflections on an
Emerging Commerce Clause Restraint on State Taxation, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 138, 139
(1988) [hereinafter Hellerstein, Is Internal Consistency Foolish?]; Walter Hellerstein,
State Taxation of Interstate Business: Perspectives on Two Centuries of Constitutional
Adjudication, 41 Tax Law. 37, 57 (1987) [hereinafter Hellerstein, State Taxation of
Interstate Business]; James H. Peters, Sales/Use Taxes: Is FairApportionment a Proper
Test?, 6 St. Tax Notes 105, 105 (1994).
2. See, e.g., Maine v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 142 U.S. 217, 217-19 (1891);
Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U.S. 18, 26 (1891).
3. The Court has famously described its decisions in the area as comprising a
"tangled underbrush" and a "quagmire," calling them "'not always clear... consistent
or reconcilable."' Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S.
450, 457-58 (1959) (quoting Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344 (1954));
see also Jerome R. Hellerstein & Walter Hellerstein, State and Local Taxation 189
(7th ed. 2001).
4. 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
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fairly apportioned violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.5
The fair apportionment requirement serves two distinct functions in
constitutional adjudication.

First, the fair apportionment of state

taxes imposed on interstate commercial activity, at least in theory,
eliminates the risk of multiple or duplicative taxation of such

commerce simply because it crosses state borders.6 If each state only
taxes that portion of the relevant value that fairly reflects the

taxpayer's activities in that state, the taxpayer should be immune from
state taxation on more than 100% of that value (whether it be income,
property, consumption, or something else).
Second, fair
apportionment effectively prevents state governments from projecting
their taxing powers beyond their borders.' A fairly apportioned tax is
appropriately limited (at least roughly) to those values or activities
over which the state has jurisdiction, and therefore prevents

extraterritorial taxation.
This article explores the meaning of the fair apportionment
requirement in state taxation-the command that states divide values
attributable to activities occurring in more than one state-and its
implications for the breadth of states' taxing powers.' It makes three
5. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. Peck, 342 U.S. 382 (1952); Johnson Oil Ref. Co.
v. Oklahoma ex rel. Mitchell, 290 U.S. 158 (1933); Union Tank Line v. Wright, 249
U.S. 275 (1919); Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U.S. 194 (1905).
6. Hellerstein, State Taxation of Interstate Business, supra note 1, at 57.
"Multiple taxation" in this context means duplicative tax burdens imposed on
taxpayers doing business across state lines that are not imposed on taxpayers doing
business exclusively in one state. See Hellerstein, Is "InternalConsistency" Foolish?,
supra note 1, at 139 n.13. For instance, suppose a New York corporation that did
business exclusively within the state of New York was subject to a tax on exactly
100% of its income. If New York imposed a tax on 100% of the income of a
multistate corporation, while New Jersey imposed a tax on 30% of the same
corporation's income, that corporation would be subject to multiple taxation on 30%
of its income. Because the firm is engaged in interstate commerce, it is taxed on
130% of its income, while the purely intrastate business is taxed on only 100% of its
income.
7. See Hellerstein, Is "Internal Consistency" Foolish?, supra note 1, at 186
("Wholly apart from its role in preventing multiple taxation, the fair apportionment
criterion serves to limit the territorial reach of state power by requiring that the
state's tax base corresponds to the taxpayer's in-state presence.").
8. The focus of this article is the constitutional requirement that a state divide
the relevant interstate tax base-the apportionment aspect of the fair apportionment
requirement. It therefore generally does not address the fairness of a state's method
of apportionment. Clearly, the two issues are closely related, as an unfairly
apportioned tax can produce the same problems as an unapportioned tax-namely,
multiple taxation and extraterritorial taxation. Evaluating the constitutional standard
for the fairness of a method of apportioning interstate values, however, raises a host
of issues-the Supreme Court's institutional competence, the role of Congress, and
the place of discriminatory purpose analysis, to name a few-that are beyond the
scope of what I mean to address here. I have therefore set those questions aside for
purposes of this article, although I admit that a fully comprehensive treatment of this
subject would address them.
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distinct but related points.
The first point is that the fair
apportionment of state taxes is really a "lower order" constitutional
value; that is, rather than being an independent constitutional end, fair
apportionment is a means to accomplish two other, more fundamental
constitutional objectives. First, by preventing multiple taxation, fair
apportionment prevents states from discriminating against interstate
commerce. The imposition of multiple tax burdens on interstate
commerce that are not also borne by purely intrastate commerce
discriminates in practical effect against commercial activity crossing
state lines. Second, by limiting a state to taxing its fair share of the
relevant tax base, fair apportionment protects interstate commerce
from extraterritorial taxation, ensuring that states tax only those
activities or values with which they have a sufficient nexus.9 Properly
understood, then, fair apportionment is no more than a reasonable
and effective means to ensuring compliance with two other, "higher
order" objectives of the Commerce and Due Process Clauses:
protecting interstate commerce from discrimination, and preserving
the state's nexus with the values it seeks to tax.
A second point is that, in examining how the Supreme Court has
actually applied the fair apportionment test, it is clear that, although
the fair apportionment of state taxes is preferred, it is not always
required. In a handful of recent cases, the Court has upheld state
taxes as "fairly apportioned" even though the taxes at issue were, in
actuality, completely unapportioned. 1°
The cases presented
circumstances in which the nature of the tax (or the class of taxes of
which it was a part) made division of the tax base by the state
administratively cumbersome or impractical. Without saying as much,
the Court held that, under these conditions, the absence of
apportionment is constitutionally permissible so long as the state's
taxing scheme otherwise ensures that interstate commerce is not
disadvantaged. Thus, despite the Court's consistent incantation of fair

9. "Nexus" here refers to the state's connection with the interstate activity or
value being taxed, not with the taxpayer. The Constitution requires a taxing state to
have a sufficient nexus with both the taxpayer and the activity or value it seeks to tax.
See Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 504 U.S. 768, 778 (1992) ("[I]n the
case of a tax on an activity, there must be a connection to the activity itself, rather
than a connection only to the actor the State seeks to tax." (citation omitted));
Hellerstein & Hellerstein, supra note 3, at 355; Walter Hellerstein, State Taxation of
Electronic Commerce, 52 Tax L. Rev. 425, 434-35 (1997). Thus, a tax could be fairly
apportioned without the state having a sufficient nexus with the taxpayer, and could
render the application of the tax impermissible on jurisdictional grounds. The point
here is that, regardless of whether the state has nexus with the taxpayer, fair
apportionment ensures that the state has a sufficient nexus with the interstate value
(or the portion of that value) that it is taxing.
10. See, e.g., Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175 (1995)
(involving a tax on interstate bus fares); Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252 (1989)
(considering a tax on telecommunications).
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apportionment as a constitutional necessity, in certain circumstances
state taxes on interstate commerce need not be apportioned at all.
Third and finally, this understanding of fair apportionment-as
representing a constitutional preference rather than an inflexible
requirement-reveals something significant about the present state of
constitutional law, at least with respect to state and local taxation.
Despite the basic understanding of state authority within our federal
system as being limited to the regulation of activity occurring within a
state's own borders, the Constitution actually permits states to project
their taxing powers beyond their jurisdictions.
Although the
circumstances under which such extraterritorial taxation is permissible
are limited, the point is significant. As states grapple with new forms
of commerce-many of which map poorly onto traditional
conceptions of geographic jurisdiction-we should be cognizant that a
degree of extraterritorial taxation is constitutionally permissible, at
least when there are practical barriers to dividing the relevant tax
base. Indeed, allowing the states to craft practical solutions to the
problems of taxing modern commercial activity, even when it means
some measure of extraterritorial taxation, furthers the important
constitutional objective of ensuring that the states remain vital and
independent centers of governmental power.
This article proceeds in three parts. Part I discusses the purposes of
the fair apportionment requirement and explains how it is actually a
"lower order" constitutional norm. Part II sets out how some of the
Court's recent decisions have not actually required the fair
apportionment of state taxes, even while nominally imposing the test.
These cases reveal that fair apportionment is more of a constitutional
preference than a requirement. Finally, Part III explores the
implications of this understanding of fair apportionment in state
taxation. Significantly, it demonstrates that states are not always
limited to taxing only that activity occurring within their borders, the
Court's many assertions to the contrary notwithstanding. In truth,
the supposedly "fundamental" postulate that states cannot tax
extraterritorial values12 is not a rigid prohibition but a flexible
principle, one that the Court has pragmatically bent to accommodate
the states' need to protect their fiscal authority. This insight could
become increasingly important to preserving the practical values of
federalism in a world where more and more commercial transactions
lack clear territorial locations.

11. See, e.g., ASARCO, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 458 U.S. 307, 315 (1982)

("[A] State may not tax value earned outside its borders.").
12. See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Comm'r of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 451 (1980) (Stevens, J.,

dissenting) ("It is fundamental that a State has no power to impose a tax on income
earned outside of the State.").
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I. FAIR APPORTIONMENT AS A "LOWER ORDER" CONSTITUTIONAL
VALUE

It is blackletter law that a state tax imposed on a multistate business
must "be fairly apportioned to reflect the [taxpayer's] business
conducted in the State.' 1 3 Unlike other aspects of constitutional
doctrine in this area, the fair apportionment requirement has deep
historical roots. 4 Not long after the 1872 Case of the State Freight
Tax" 5-the first case in which the Supreme Court squarely invalidated
a state tax on dormant Commerce Clause grounds 6-the Court
suggested that the fair apportionment of state taxes was
constitutionally necessary. For instance, in the 1891 case of Maine v.
Grand Trunk Railway Co.,' 7 the Court reviewed a gross receipts tax
imposed on an interstate railroad. 8

Maine had computed the

railroad's gross receipts attributable to the state by multiplying the
railroad's total receipts (earned within and without the state) by a
fraction, the fraction representing the proportion of the railroad's rail
line mileage in Maine to its rail line mileage everywhere.

9

In

upholding the tax against constitutional challenge, the Court broadly
endorsed Maine's method of determining the gross receipts taxable by

the state: "The rule of apportioning the charge to the receipts of the
business would seem to be eminently reasonable, and likely to

produce the most satisfactory results, both to the State and the
corporation taxed."2"'
Under current doctrine, fair apportionment is an independent
prong of the four-part Complete Auto test, which the Court has
invoked in addressing virtually every dormant Commerce Clause
challenge to a state or local state tax since 1977.21

Complete Auto

13. Armco Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638, 644 (1984).
14. See Hellerstein, Is "Internal Consistency" Foolish?, supra note 1, at 139 ("The
Court has long interpreted the commerce and due process clauses as requiring that
taxes be fairly apportioned to the taxpayer's activities in the taxing state.").
15. 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 232 (1872).
16. See Hellerstein & Hellerstein, supra note 3, at 191.
17. 142 U.S. 217 (1891).
18. Id. at 217-20.
19. Id. at 220.
20. Id. at 228.
21. See, e.g., Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 183 (1995);
Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298, 310-11 (1994); Itel Containers
Int'l Corp. v. Huddleston, 507 U.S. 60, 73 (1993); Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504
U.S. 298, 311 (1992); Trinova Corp. v. Mich. Dep't of Treasury, 498 U.S. 358, 372
(1991); Amerada Hess Corp. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, N.J. Dep't of Treasury, 490
U.S. 66, 72-73 (1989); Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 257-60 (1989); D.H. Holmes
Co. v. McNamara, 486 U.S. 24, 30 (1988); Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. Scheiner, 483
U.S. 266, 291 (1987); Wardair Can., Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1, 8 (1986);
Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 617 (1981); Maryland v.
Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 754 (1981); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Comm'r of Taxes, 445 U.S.
425, 443 (1980); Dep't of Revenue v. Ass'n of Wash. Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S. 734,
745-46 (1978); see also Walter Hellerstein, Michael J. McIntyre & Richard D. Pomp,
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concerned a Mississippi tax imposed on the privilege of doing business
in the state measured by the taxpayer's gross receipts from Mississippi
sales. 2 The taxpayer, relying on well-established Supreme Court
precedent, challenged the tax's constitutionality solely on the ground
that the dormant Commerce Clause prohibited states from formally
taxing the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce. 3 The Court
in Complete Auto overruled the decisions that had established this
formalistic rule and upheld Mississippi's tax. 4 In doing so, the Court
stated that a state tax will satisfy the Commerce Clause when it meets
four criteria: "the tax is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus
with the taxing state, is fairly apportioned, does not discriminate
against interstate commerce, and is fairly related to the services
provided."25 As subsequent decisions confirm, the Court therefore
treats fair apportionment as a discrete aspect of this four-part test for
26
evaluating state taxes under the Commerce Clause.
Further, fair apportionment is often (though not always) necessary
as a matter of due process. 27 The Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a state from taxing interstate values
or activities "unless there is a minimal connection or nexus between
the interstate activities and the taxing State, and a rational
relationship between the income attributed to the State and the
intrastate values of the enterprise. '28 A state tax that is not fairly
apportioned is apt to reach interstate values with which the state lacks
a "minimal connection," and such a tax will often have no "rational
29
relationship" to the taxpayer's activities in the state.
Commerce Clause Restraints on State Taxation After Jefferson Lines, 51 Tax L. Rev.
47, 49 & n.13 (1995).
22. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 275 (1977).
23. Id. at 278.
24. Id. at 288-89.
25. Id. at 279 (emphasis added).
26. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
27. See Hellerstein, Is "Internal Consistency" Foolish?, supra note 1, at 139. The
Due Process Clause traditionally has not required the apportionment of an income
tax imposed on a business by the state in which the business is commercially
domiciled. This is because domicile itself has been considered a sufficient basis for a
state to assert jurisdiction over all of a taxpayer's income, wherever it is earned. See
New York ex rel. Cohn v. Graves, 300 U.S. 308, 312-13 (1937) ("That the receipt of
income by a resident of the territory of a taxing sovereignty is a taxable event is
universally recognized. Domicil [sic] itself affords a basis for such taxation."); Shaffer
v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37, 57 (1920) ("As to residents [the state] may, and does, exert its
taxing power over their income from all sources, whether within or without the
State .... "); Hellerstein & Hellerstein, supra note 3, at 368-69.
28. Hunt-Wesson, Inc. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 528 U.S. 458, 464 (2000) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463
U.S. 159, 165-66 (1983); Exxon Corp. v. Wis. Dep't of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207, 219-20
(1980); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Comm'r of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425,436, 437 (1980).
29. For example, suppose an Illinois-based airline uses its airplanes throughout
the United States and the world in interstate and international commerce. Although
many of the airline's planes spend a portion of their time in Illinois, none spend all of
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The logic behind fair apportionment is that each state is only
entitled to its "fair share" of the interstate value it seeks to tax. 30 That
is, no state should have the authority to tax 100% of any valuewhether that value be property, income, or something else-that is
attributable to commercial activity taking place in more than one

state.3'

Apportionment is most familiar in the sphere of state corporate
income taxes. Because tracing income earned by an interstate
business to its geographic origin based on some type of separate
accounting methodology presents enormous practical problems (and
is arguably incoherent in theory), states have long used the method of
formulary apportionment to determine the amount of income earned
by multistate corporations within their borders.3 2 Under formulary
their time there, and many planes spend none of their time there. If Illinois
attempted to impose an unapportioned property tax on the full assessed value of the
airline's fleet of planes, it would lack a "minimal connection" with the value of the
planes attributable to other states (especially those that spend no time in Illinois).
Similarly, the tax would not be "rationally related" to the value of the property
employed by the airline in Illinois. See Standard Oil v. Peck, 342 U.S. 382, 385 (1952)
(striking down an unapportioned tax imposed on a full fleet of barges used in multiple
states because the tax bore "no relation to the opportunities, benefits, or protection
which the taxing state gives [the taxpayer's] operations").
It is true that, in Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292 (1944), the
Supreme Court upheld an unapportioned property tax on the full value of an airline's
fleet of planes imposed by the airline's state of commercial domicile. But this
decision, handed down during a period in which the Court had briefly returned to
doctrinal formalism, was effectively overruled by BraniffAirways, Inc. v. Neb. State
Bd. of Equalization, 347 U.S. 590 (1954). See Hellerstein & Hellerstein, supra note 3,
at 256. Braniff upheld the right of states other than the state of domicile to impose an
apportioned property tax on the value of the airplanes used in the state. 347 U.S. at
597-98.
30. See, e.g., Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 184 (1995);
Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 260-61 (1989) ("[T]he central purpose behind the
apportionment requirement is to ensure that each State taxes only its fair share of an
interstate transaction.").
31. See Japan Line, Ltd. v. Los Angeles County, 441 U.S. 434, 447 (1979) ("The
corollary of the apportionment principle, of course, is that no jurisdiction may tax the
instrumentality [of commerce] in full."); Johnson Oil Ref. Co. v. Oklahoma ex rel.
Mitchell, 290 U.S. 158, 162 (1933) ("When a fleet of cars is habitually employed in
several States-the individual cars constantly running in and out of each State-it
cannot be said that any one of the States is entitled to tax the entire number of cars
regardless of their use in other States.").
An exception to this general principle is that the state of a corporation's
commercial domicile has traditionally been permitted to assert jurisdiction over all of
the corporation's income, wherever earned. See Hellerstein & Hellerstein, supra note
3, at 368-69. The Supreme Court has suggested, however, that such residence-based
jurisdiction must give way to any state asserting source-based jurisdiction over the
same income, thus preventing multiple taxation. See Mobil Oil, 445 U.S. at 445-46;
Walter Hellerstein, State Income Taxation of Multijurisdictional Corporations:
Reflections on Mobil, Exxon, and H.R. 5076, 79 Mich. L. Rev. 113, 135-37 (1980).
32. See Hellerstein & Hellerstein, supra note 3, at 469-70; see also Mobil Oil, 445
U.S. at 438 ("[S]eparate accounting, while it purports to isolate portions of income
received in various States, may fail to account for contributions to income resulting
from functional integration, centralization of management, and economies of scale.");
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apportionment, all income earned by a taxpayer in the operation of its

unitary business is included in the taxpayer's apportionable tax base.
That base is then multiplied by a percentage determined by a
statutory formula, which formula is designed to reflect the portion of
the taxpayer's economic activity occurring in the taxing state. State
formulas for the division of corporate income vary, but most are based
on a combination of the taxpayer's percentage of property, payroll,

and sales located or occurring in the taxing state.33 Used properly, this
method of dividing a multistate corporation's income reasonably
approximates the amount of income earned by the taxpayer in the
taxing state, and therefore satisfies the requirement of fair
apportionment.
Recently the Supreme Court has further fleshed out the fair
apportionment requirement, explaining that it comprises two discrete
sub-requirements. Specifically, the Court will "determine whether a
tax is fairly apportioned by examining whether it is internally and
externally consistent. ' 34 The "internal consistency" test asks whether,
if the taxing scheme at issue were adopted by all fifty states, interstate
commerce would be taxed more heavily than purely intrastate
commerce.

It "simply looks to the structure of the tax at issue to see

whether its identical application by every State in the Union would
place interstate commerce at a disadvantage as compared with

commerce intrastate. ' 36 The "external consistency" test, in contrast,
focuses on the legitimacy of the state's claim to the interstate value it
Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 315 U.S. 501, 508-09 (1942) (holding that the taxpayer's
separate accounting evidence did nothing to "impeach the validity or propriety" of
the state's method of formulary apportionment).
33. The Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act, 7A U.L.A. 356 (1999)
("UDITPA"), the model statute for the division of income of multistate businesses
that has been adopted, at least in part, by roughly half of the states imposing
corporate income taxes, see Hellerstein & Hellerstein, supra note 3, at 571, prescribes
a formula that places equal weight on the taxpayer's property, payroll, and sales in the
state. UDITPA § 9. Most states have adopted similar formulas, see Walter
Hellerstein, State Taxation of Corporate Income from Intangibles: Allied-Signal and
Beyond, 48 Tax L. Rev. 739, 753 (1993), though a majority of states now place greater
weight on the sales factor than the property or payroll factors, and a handful of states
apportion income based on the sales factor alone. See Hellerstein & Hellerstein, supra
note 3, at 581-82 (table 2); see also id. at 491.
34. Goldberg, 488 U.S. at 261; see also Jefferson Lines, 514 U.S. at 185 ("For over
a decade now, we have assessed any threat of malapportionment by asking whether
the tax is 'internally consistent' and, if so, whether it is 'externally consistent' as
well.").
35. See Jefferson Lines, 514 U.S. at 185 ("Internal consistency is preserved when
the imposition of a tax identical to the one in question by every other State would add
no burden to interstate commerce that intrastate commerce would not also bear.");
Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 169 (1983) ("The first,
and again obvious, component of fairness in an apportionment formula is what might
be called internal consistency-that is, the formula must be such that, if applied by
every jurisdiction, it would result in no more than all of the unitary business' income
being taxed.").
36. Jefferson Lines, 514 U.S. at 185.
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seeks to tax. It "looks not to the logical consequences of cloning, but
to the economic justification for the State's claim upon the value
taxed, to discover whether a State's tax reaches beyond that portion of
value that is fairly attributable to economic activity within the taxing
State."37
These requirements of internal and external consistency roughly
mirror the two distinct constitutional purposes that fair
apportionment serves. First, fair apportionment prevents states from
imposing duplicative tax burdens on taxpayers simply because they do
business across state lines, a problem generally known as "multiple
taxation."3 8 If every state in which a multistate business operates
taxes only a fairly apportioned share of the relevant value, then, at
least in theory, there should be no multiple taxation.39 Instead, the
sum of the various apportioned shares should be 100% of the taxed
value. Of course, if states employ differing schemes for apportioning
that value (which they typically do), there will be some overlap and
some gaps; some taxpayers will be taxed on a bit more than 100% of
the value, while others will be taxed on a bit less than 100%.40 But the
37. Id.; see also Goldberg, 488 U.S. at 262 ("The external consistency test asks
whether the State has taxed only that portion of the revenues from the interstate
activity which reasonably reflects the in-state component of the activity being
taxed.").
38. As the Supreme Court has noted, the "principle of fair share is the lineal
descendant of... [the] prohibition on multiple taxation." Jefferson Lines, 514 U.S. at
184; see also Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 299 n.12 (1997) ("the
requirement of apportionment... assur[es] that interstate activities are not unjustly
burdened by multistate taxation"); Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441
U.S. 434, 446-47 (1979) ("In order to prevent multiple taxation of interstate
commerce, this Court has required that taxes be apportioned among taxing
jurisdictions, so that no instrumentality of commerce is subjected to more than one
tax on its full value."); Standard Oil Co. v. Peck, 342 U.S. 382, 384-85 (1952) ("The
rule which permits taxation by two or more states on an apportionment basis
precludes taxation of all of the property by the state of domicile.... Otherwise there
would be multiple taxation of interstate operations .... ").
39. See Hellerstein, Is "InternalConsistency" Foolish?, supra note 1, at 139-40.
40. See id. at 140. The constitutionality of multiple taxation resulting from
differing schemes for apportioning income was precisely the issue in Moorman
Manufacturing Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267 (1978). There, the Court reasoned that
because "some risk of duplicative taxation exists whenever the States in which a
corporation does business do not follow identical rules for the division of income,"
upholding the taxpayer's claim would have required the Court "to prescribe a
uniform definition of" the proper formula for dividing income. Id. at 278. Because
the Court believed that the best method of apportionment was an issue better
resolved by Congress, it declined to hold that such overlap-so long as the state's
method of apportionment was itself fair-violated the Constitution. See id. at 280-81;
see also Walter Hellerstein, Commerce Clause Restraints on State Taxation:
Purposeful Economic Protectionism and Beyond, 85 Mich. L. Rev. 758, 763-64 (1987).
Moorman involved the fairness of a state's method of apportionment, not the
requirement that the relevant tax base be apportioned at all. For the reasons
mentioned earlier, questions concerning the fairness of a particular apportionmentand not the command that states apportion the relevant tax base-are outside the
scope of this article. See supra note 8.
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general point is that if a state determines its share of the relevant tax
base in a manner that is internally consistent, interstate commerce
should not bear any duplicative tax burdens not borne by businesses
operating purely within one state.41
A second purpose of fair apportionment, reflected in the external
consistency test, is to restrict each state's taxing authority to its own
jurisdiction. Each state (at least other than the state of commercial
domicile in the case of income taxes42) should be entitled to tax only
that value earned within its borders, or which rightfully reflects the
degree of the taxpayer's activity in that state.43
The fair
apportionment of the tax base, by limiting the amount attributable to
each state, ensures that states only tax those values properly subject to
their respective taxing powers. This jurisdictional concern is distinct
from the goal of preventing multiple taxation. A state could well
impose a tax that is not fairly apportioned without creating a risk of
multiple taxation. A simple example illustrates the point.
Suppose that the Acme Corporation, commercially domiciled in
Delaware, does business and earns income in California and Oregon.
Suppose further that California imposes a tax on all of Acme's
income, wherever it is earned, but extends to Acme a credit for any
income taxes it pays other states. Such a tax scheme would be
internally consistent; the credit provision would ensure that, if every
state adopted the same scheme, there would be no multiple taxation.44
Still, the tax is not fairly apportioned. If Oregon happened not to
impose a corporate income tax, California would tax all of Acme's
income earned in Oregon, not just that income earned in California.
Consequently, California would plainly be projecting its taxing powers
beyond its borders, asserting jurisdiction over income attributable to
another state.
While precluding multiple taxation, the credit
provision-unlike fair apportionment-would do nothing to preclude
extraterritorial taxation. Thus, as Professor Hellerstein has noted,
"[w]holly apart from its role in preventing multiple taxation, the fair
apportionment criterion serves to limit the territorial reach of state
power by requiring that the
state's tax base corresponds to the
46
taxpayer's in-state presence.
41. As the Supreme Court has stated, when a state tax is internally consistent, "if
every State were to impose an identical tax, no multiple taxation would result."
Goldberg, 488 U.S. at 261.
42. See supra note 27.
43. See Hellerstein, Is "Internal Consistency" Foolish?, supra note 1, at 173 ("The
critical point is that a tax levied upon interstate activity -whether measured by gross
receipts, net income, or other values-must reflect the portion of the enterprise's
activity that is being conducted in the taxing state, and the tax measure must be
adjusted accordingly.").
44. See id. at 182-83.
45. See id. at 185-86; Hellerstein, McIntyre & Pomp, supra note 21, at 110.
46. Hellerstein, Is "Internal Consistency" Foolish?, supra note 1, at 186; see also
Peters, supra note 1, at 105.
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In short, the fair apportionment requirement has two purposes: to
prevent multiple taxation, and to prevent extraterritorial taxation. It
therefore follows that fair apportionment is not an independent
constitutional end but instead a means to accomplishing two other,
"higher order" constitutional objectives: preventing discrimination
against interstate commerce and limiting states to taxing those values
with which they have a sufficient connection or nexus.4 7 In fact, fair
apportionment is essentially superfluous as a separate criterion for
assessing a state tax's constitutionality. State taxes that are not fairly
apportioned should generally be found unconstitutional based either
on their discrimination against interstate commerce or on their failure
of nexus, regardless of fair apportionment concerns.
First, multiple taxation is a species of discrimination against
interstate commerce-a disadvantage in practical effect imposed on
business done across state lines that is not faced by purely intrastate
business." A state tax scheme that subjects multistate taxpayers to
multiple taxation thus violates the dormant Commerce Clause without
reference to whether it is fairly apportioned. It runs afoul of the third
prong of the Complete Auto test, which demands that state taxes "not
discriminate against interstate commerce. '49 Indeed, the Supreme
Court has invalidated unapportioned state taxes precisely because the
effect of such taxes was to discriminate against interstate commerce.
At issue in Nippert v. City of Richmond,"' for example, was a city
license tax imposed on all solicitors or selling agents." The measure
of the tax was a flat $50 plus 0.5% of all of a solicitor's gross receipts
exceeding $1000.52 The Court held that, because the levy-at least
until the solicitor earned $1000 in receipts-"lack[ed] any proportion
to the number or length of visits or the volume of the business or
return,"5 3 it had "exclusionary" and "discriminatory effects" that
disfavored out-of-state operators. 4
This "discrimination against
interstate commerce, in favor of local competing business," violated
the Commerce Clause.
Similarly, in American Trucking Ass'ns v.
Scheiner,5 6 the Court invalidated Pennsylvania's unapportioned
"marker fees" and axle taxes imposed on all motor carriers doing
business in the state.57 Such flat taxes were "plainly discriminatory"
47. Cf Hellerstein, McIntyre & Pomp, supra note 21, at 109 (describing the fair
apportionment requirement as "a means to [the] end" of avoiding multiple taxation).
48. See supra note 6.
49. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977).
50. 327 U.S. 416 (1946).
51. Id. at 418.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 430-31.
54. Id. at 428.
55. Id. at 434.
56. 483 U.S. 266 (1987).
57. The "marker fee" was a sum required for an identification marker, issued by
the state department of revenue, that needed to be affixed to every motor carrier
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because their practical effect was to "impose a cost per mile on [the
out-of-state taxpayer] that [was] approximately five times as heavy as
the cost per mile borne by local trucks.""8 Further, the Court
explained that the internal inconsistency of the flat taxes
impermissibly penalized interstate commerce. 9 If every state imposed
such taxes, interstate motor carriers would be liable for the
unapportioned taxes in several states, while purely intrastate carriers
would pay the flat amounts only once. 60
Second, by ensuring that each state limits its tax to its "fair share"
of interstate values, fair apportionment acts as a means to fulfilling the
independent constitutional requirement of nexus between the taxing
state and the activity or value taxed. 61 Again, fair apportionment
aside, both the Commerce Clause and the Due Process Clause require
a sufficient connection between the state and the interstate value it
seeks to tax. The first prong of the Complete Auto test demands that
state taxes only be applied to "activit[ies] with a substantial nexus with
the taxing State."62 In addition, the Due Process Clause requires that
there be a "minimal connection" between the activity taxed and the
taxing state, and that the tax be "rationally related" to the taxpayer's
activities in the state. 63 A state tax that is not fairly apportioned will
generally violate these requirements, the fair apportionment
requirement notwithstanding.
Consider Standard Oil Co. v. Peck,64 which involved an
unapportioned property tax on the taxpayer's full fleet of barges that
it used up and down the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers. Although
Standard Oil had used the barges in several states over the course of
the relevant tax year, Ohio imposed its tax on 100% of their assessed
value.65 The Supreme Court held that the tax violated the Due
Process Clause. In failing to apportion the value of the barges based
on the proportion of time that they were employed in the state, Ohio's
tax bore "no relation to the opportunities, benefits, or protection
which the taxing state [gave the taxpayer's] operations., 66 One could
add that Ohio also lacked a "minimal connection" or "substantial
vehicle traveling in the state. See id. at 273. The axle tax was an annual levy imposed
on commercial trucks traveling in the state measured by their number of axles. See id.
at 274.
58. Id. at 286.
59. Id. at 296; see Hellerstein, Is "Internal Consistency" Foolish?, supra note 1, at
146-47.
60. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 483 U.S. at 284.
61. Again, the relevant nexus here is with the value being taxed, not the taxpayer.
See supra note 9. Fair apportionment, of course, does nothing to ensure that the

taxing state will have a constitutionally sufficient connection with the taxpayer.
62. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977).
63. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
64. 342 U.S. 382 (1952).

65. See id. at 383.
66. Id. at 385.
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nexus" with that portion of the fleet's value that was employed by the
taxpayer in other states.
If fair apportionment exists to accomplish the ends of preventing
discrimination and sustaining nexus with the value taxedrequirements independently imposed by the Commerce and Due
Process Clauses-then fair apportionment must be seen as a sort of
"lower order" constitutional value. By "lower order," I mean that it is
essentially unnecessary as a distinct constitutional test; it has no
constitutional significance independent of the two objectives it is
designed to serve. Instead, fair apportionment is an effective and
convenient means to assuring adherence to the "higher order"
constitutional norms of preventing discrimination and preserving
nexus. To paraphrase the Supreme Court's opinion in Grand Trunk
Railway, the fair apportionment of state taxes imposed on interstate
commerce is an "eminently reasonable" way of fulfilling these more
central constitutional objectives.67 It is on these terms that the fair
apportionment requirement should be understood.
II. FAIR APPORTIONMENT AS A CONSTITUTIONAL "PREFERENCE"

The notion that the fair apportionment requirement is actually a
"lower order" constitutional value-a means to accomplish the goals
of nondiscrimination and nexus rather than an end in itself-is
reinforced by the Supreme Court's application of the test in practice.
Although the Court has struck down several state taxes on the ground
that they were not fairly apportioned,68 in some recent cases it has
upheld state taxes against fair apportionment challenges where the
taxes were, in reality, completely unapportioned. To be sure, the
Court purported to hold that the taxes at issue were "fairly
apportioned, ' 69 taxing "only the activity taking place within the taxing
State."7 And two important conditions were present in these cases:
(1) the tax scheme ensured that interstate commerce was not subject
to multiple taxation, and (2) it would have been administratively
impracticable for the state to apportion the tax (or the class of taxes of
which it was a part). Nonetheless, these decisions demonstrate that
the fair apportionment "requirement" cannot accurately be termed a
constitutional requirement at all. Rather, fair apportionment is better
characterized as a constitutional preference. It is a preferred-but not
always necessary-means to serving other constitutional objectives.
67. Maine v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 142 U.S. 217,228 (1891).
68. See, e.g., Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266 (1987); Norfolk
& W. Ry. Co. v. Mo. State Tax Comm'n, 390 U.S. 317 (1968); Standard Oil, 342 U.S.

382; Cent. Greyhound Lines v. Mealey, 334 U.S. 653 (1948); Nippert v. City of
Richmond, 327 U.S. 416 (1946); Hans Rees' Sons, Inc. v. North Carolina ex rel.
Maxwell, 283 U.S. 123 (1931).
69. E.g., Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 265 (1989).
70. E.g., Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175,196 (1995).
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Consider first the Court's holding concerning fair apportionment in
The State of Louisiana had
imposed a use tax on D.H. Holmes, a Louisiana-based department
store, for the value of its merchandise catalogs mailed to Louisiana
residents. 72 The subject of the tax was "the use, the consumption, the
distribution, and the storage for use or consumption" of tangible
personal property in the state, and the Louisiana courts had held that
the levy covered the taxpayer's catalogs. 73 The state afforded
taxpayers a credit against the use tax for any sales tax paid on the
same items, but D.H. Holmes had paid no sales tax on the catalogs to
any other states.74 D.H. Holmes argued before the Supreme Court
that applying the tax to its catalogs, which had been mailed directly to
Louisiana addresses from the states in which they were printed,
violated the Commerce Clause.75
Arguably, the issue of fair apportionment was beside the point, as
the tax at issue seemed to reach purely intrastate (and no interstate)
activities. Specifically, Louisiana had imposed its tax only on the
value of those catalogs that had been mailed to Louisiana addresses,
catalogs that one could reasonably assume were used exclusively
within the state's borders. If the subject of a tax-here, the use of the
catalogs-is attributable exclusively to one state, apportionment is
simply irrelevant, as only one state can claim the value as its own.
Nonetheless, the Court addressed the fair apportionment question,
offering the following answer: "The Louisiana taxing scheme is fairly
apportioned, for it provides a credit against its use tax for sales taxes
that have been paid in other States."76 Such reasoning, however,
confuses fair apportionment with the prevention of multiple taxation,
issues that are analytically distinct.77 As discussed earlier, through the
provision of credits for taxes paid to other states, a state tax scheme
can prevent multiple taxation even though it is completely
7
unapportioned.
' The Court's analysis in D.H. Holmes conflated these
separate questions and, in doing so, implied that an unapportioned
state tax could nevertheless be considered "fairly apportioned" if it
protected interstate commerce from multiple taxation.
Next consider the Court's decision in Goldberg v. Sweet. 79 At issue
was Illinois's Telecommunications Excise Tax, which imposed a five
percent tax on the full retail cost of any telecommunication that (1)
either originated or terminated in Illinois, and (2) was billed to an
D.H. Holmes Co. v. McNamara.7'

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

486 U.S. 24 (1988).
Id. at 26.
Id. at 27-29 & n.1.
Id. at 31-32.
Id. at 28-30.
Id. at 31.
See Hellerstein, Is "InternalConsistency" Foolish?,supra note 1, at 184-85.

78. See supra text accompanying notes 40-42.
79. 488 U.S. 252 (1989).
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Illinois service address.8" To avoid multiple taxation, Illinois provided
a credit to any taxpayer who could demonstrate that the same
telecommunication had been taxed by another state. 81 A group of
taxpayers claimed that the tax was unconstitutional on the ground that
it was unapportioned; its measure was the full gross charge of the
telecommunication, even when the telecommunication crossed state
boundaries.82 For example, suppose an Illinois resident placed a longdistance call costing $5.00 to a Missouri resident, and the call was
billed to an Illinois service address. Illinois imposed its tax on the full
$5.00 charge of the call, even though a portion of the activity being
taxed (arguably half) occurred outside the state. As the Illinois trial
court concluded, the "tax by its own terms is not fairly apportioned"
because "Illinois is attempting to tax the entire cost of an interstate
act which takes place only partially in Illinois."83
The Supreme Court nonetheless upheld the tax, citing a variety of
justifications. First, the Court noted that the "tax at issue [had] many
of the characteristics of a sales tax."'
In particular, the tax was
"assessed on the individual consumer, collected by the retailer, and
accompanie[d] the retail purchase of an interstate telephone call."85
Second, the Court observed that the tax avoided any problem of
multiple taxation.86 The circumstances under which more than one
state would have a sufficient nexus with the same telecommunication
to impose a tax were rare, and on the few occasions that this might
occur, the credit provision precluded the possibility of actual multiple
taxation.87 Finally, the Court stated that, unlike cases involving
highways or rail lines, this tax involved "the more intangible
movement of electronic impulses through computerized networks."88
Consequently, an "apportionment formula based on mileage or some
other geographic division of individual telephone calls would produce
insurmountable administrative and technological barriers."89 To the
Court, Illinois's tax was "a realistic legislative solution to the
technology of the present-day telecommunications industry."9
Regardless of whether these observations were correct, they were
essentially non sequiturs. None actually speaks to whether the Illinois
tax was fairly apportioned: the tax's similarity to a sales tax merely

80. Id. at 256.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 260.
83. Id. at 258 (quoting the trial court's opinion, Goldberg v. Johnson, No. 85 CH
8081 (Cook County Ct. Oct. 21, 1986)).
84. Id. at 262.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 263-64.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 264.
89. Id. at 264-65.
90. Id. at 265.

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71

shows that it resembled a tax that traditionally has been
unapportioned; the credit provision's prevention of multiple taxation
just shows that one of fair apportionment's principal objectives had
otherwise been fulfilled, albeit by other means; and the practical
barriers to dividing the tax base only show that apportionment may
have been logistically difficult, if not impossible.
These are
justifications for dispensing with the fair apportionment requirement
in this particular context, not reasons that the tax was, in fact, fairly
apportioned." Thus, the Court's stated conclusion that "the Tax Act
is fairly apportioned" cannot be taken literally. Instead, Goldberg
must be understood as holding that the Illinois Telecommunications
Tax was constitutional despite being completely unapportioned. 2
One might argue, as Justice Stevens did in his concurring opinion,
that the Illinois tax was effectively apportioned in light of its overall
incidence.93 Specifically, if one considers the entire universe of
telecommunications originating or terminating in Illinois, although
Illinois taxed the full value of interstate calls billed to Illinois service
addresses, it taxed none of the value of such calls billed to out-of-state
service addresses.94 If an Illinois-Missouri call were billed to a
Missouri address, for example, Illinois would impose no tax at all.
Assuming half of the interstate telecommunications originating or
terminating in Illinois were billed to Illinois service addresses, the tax
was roughly apportioned, as Illinois taxed half the total value of all
interstate calls originating or terminating in the state.9
Such rough apportionment of the tax shows that, at least under
certain assumptions, Illinois was taxing approximately its fair share of
the relevant tax base. But this does not mean that the tax was fairly
apportioned. First, the argument is founded on the unrealistic
assumption that it will all come out in the wash-that half of the
interstate telecommunications originating or terminating in a given
state are billed to out-of-state service addresses. This assumption
seems wrong with respect to many states; at the very least, there was
no empirical evidence to support it.96 Second, as to those interstate
telecommunications billed to Illinois service addresses, Illinois was
plainly taxing more than its fair share. Pointing out that Illinois was
91. See Hellerstein, Is "Internal Consistency" Foolish?, supra note 1, at 187.
92. Goldberg, 488 U.S. at 265. My point here is not that the Court's decision was
wrong, but only that the Court upheld a tax on interstate activity despite the tax's
clear lack of apportionment.
93. See id. at 269-70 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the

judgment).
94. Id. at 269 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).

95. Id. at 269-70 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
96. Justice Stevens simply assumed, without explanation, that Illinois was "taxing
half of the relevant universe of interstate calls." Id. at 269 (Stevens, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment); see also id. at 270 n.2 (Stevens, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment) (relying on the same assumption).
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taxing less than its fair share of other telecommunications does not
solve this problem. While the rough apportionment of the tax base
might provide an additional justification for waiving the fair
apportionment requirement under the particular circumstances of the
case, it does nothing to demonstrate that Illinois's tax was actually
apportioned fairly.
Finally, consider the Court's 1995 decision in Oklahoma Tax
Commission v. Jefferson Lines, Inc.97 In that case, Oklahoma had
imposed its general retail sales tax on the purchase of bus
transportation (among other things), and the tax's measure was the
full retail price of the ticket. 98 The tax was nominally imposed on the
purchaser, but the seller was legally obligated to collect and remit the
tax to the state. 99 Jefferson Lines, a bus company that had since gone
bankrupt, had not collected the tax on tickets for interstate travel sold
in Oklahoma (although it had collected the tax on tickets for travel
In the taxpayer's bankruptcy
solely within Oklahoma).°°
proceedings, the state asserted a claim for the unpaid sales taxes, and
Jefferson Lines resisted on the ground that the tax was
unconstitutional as applied to tickets for interstate travel.'0 ' It argued,
like the taxpayers in Goldberg, that Oklahoma's tax failed the fair
apportionment requirement because it taxed the full retail value of
the tickets even though a portion of the services purchased were
provided and consumed outside the state. 2
A hypothetical, alternative method for the bus company to collect
its fare (conceived by Professors Hellerstein, McIntyre, and Pomp)
shows how the tax reached activity occurring in other states. 3
Suppose a passenger agreed to purchase a bus ticket for travel from
Tulsa, Oklahoma, to Lawrence, Kansas, for $40. Suppose that,
instead of collecting the $40 in Tulsa, Jefferson Lines first drove the
passenger to the Oklahoma-Kansas border and collected $15 for the
Oklahoma portion of the trip. It then completed the trip to Lawrence
and collected the remaining $25. Oklahoma clearly could impose its
sales tax on the $15 fare for the transportation provided in Oklahoma,
but the state would be projecting its taxing power beyond its borders
if it attempted to tax the $25 sale for transportation provided and
consumed exclusively in Kansas. Yet, by taxing the entire $40 when
the passenger paid the full fare in Tulsa for the same trip, this is
precisely what Oklahoma accomplished.

97. 514 U.S. 175 (1995).
98. Id. at 177-79.
99. Id. at 177-78.
100. Id. at 178.
101. Id. at 178-79.
102. Id. at 178, 191-92; see also Hellerstein, McIntyre & Pomp, supra note 21, at 52.
103. See Hellerstein, McIntyre & Pomp, supra note 21, at 63; see also Hellerstein &
Hellerstein, supra note 3, at 835-36.
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As in Goldberg, the Court found the tax constitutional despite the
absence of apportionment.
First, the Court reasoned that the
Oklahoma tax was properly classified as a "garden-variety sales
tax."1 And, as the Court explained, it has "perennially sustained"
such taxes, "even though levied on goods that have traveled in
interstate commerce to the point of sale or that will move across state
lines thereafter."1"5 Second, the Court concluded that there was little
or no risk of multiple taxation." 6 The Court conceded that passengers
could potentially be subjected to a use tax on the portion of the
transportation services that they consumed in other states.'0 7 But the
Court noted that "any use tax would have to comply with Commerce
Clause requirements," meaning that "the tax scheme could not apply
differently to goods and services purchased out of state from those
purchased domestically."'' 8 Thus, if the state provided a credit against
its use tax for sales taxes paid in that state-which every state
imposing a use tax does-it would also have to provide the credit for
sales taxes paid to other states." 9 As a result, "the Oklahoma ticket
purchaser would be free from multiple taxation. 1..
Again, the Court's conclusions, so far as they go, seem
unobjectionable. The Oklahoma tax was essentially a "garden-variety
sales tax," and the risk of multiple taxation was effectively
nonexistent. But these are not explanations for why the tax was fairly
apportioned or how Oklahoma had taxed only its fair share of the
interstate value.
Rather, these are justifications for upholding
Oklahoma's tax despite its lack of apportionment. As with the tax in
Goldberg, Oklahoma's tax plainly was not apportioned to reflect the
share of the taxed activity that occurred within the state's borders.
Thus, the Court's statement that the tax "reach[ed] only the activity
taking place within the taxing State" is implausible."' Such reasoning
confuses actual fair apportionment with reasons that a tax that is not
fairly apportioned may nonetheless be constitutionally tolerable. In
short, Jefferson Lines, like Goldberg, stands for the proposition that a
completely unapportioned tax imposed on interstate commercial
1 2
activity, at least under certain conditions, can still be constitutional."
104. Jefferson Lines, 514 U.S. at 196.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 191-95.
107. See id. at 193-94.
108. Id. at 194.
109. In fact, every state that imposes a use tax provides such a credit, regardless of
the state to which the sales taxes were paid. See 2 Jerome R. Hellerstein & Walter
Hellerstein, State Taxation $ 18.08[1] (3d ed. 2002).
110. Jefferson Lines, 514 U.S. at 194.
111. Id. at 196.
112. See Hellerstein, State Taxation of Electronic Commerce, supra note 9, at 474;
Hellerstein, McIntyre & Pomp, supra note 21, at 108-09 (explaining that in Jefferson
Lines, "the Court recognized that the fair apportionment requirement.., embraces
core constitutional values that are not fully captured by an invariable rule requiring
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This is not to say that these cases were wrongly decided. The taxes
challenged in both instances, as the Court noted, closely resembled
typical retail sales taxes, and such taxes are best understood as levies
on the final consumption of goods and services.113
They generally apply only to final sales and not to sales for resale;
they are separately stated; they are imposed on a transaction-bytransaction basis; they are collected by the seller from the purchaser;
and the seller may not claim that it is absorbing the tax. In other
words, the legislature intended them to be consumption taxes, to be
114
borne by the buyer ....
At times, the Supreme Court has missed this point, instead
describing retail sales taxes as being imposed "on the transfer of
ownership and possession at a particular time and place.""' 5 This
characterization implies that the taxed activity could occur only in one
But to
state, thereby obviating the need for apportionment.
conceptualize a sales tax as being levied on the transaction itself is to
It attaches
let legal form triumph over economic substance.
constitutional significance to the supposed local "incident" of the
retail sale rather than the tax's economic substance, precisely the sort
of reasoning that the Court itself has discredited in its modern
jurisprudence." 6 As the Court stated in Complete Auto (and has
reiterated several times since" 7 ), the constitutionality of a state tax
must turn on "not the formal language of the tax statute but rather its
practical effect" and "economic realities.""' 8 The "practical effect"
and "economic reality" of a retail sales tax is that it principally taxes
the value of consumption by the purchaser.
Indeed, the combined sales and use tax scheme employed by every
state imposing a retail sales tax would make little sense if retail sales
taxes were not intended as levies on the consumption of the taxed
that an interstate tax base be divided among the states").
113. See John F. Due & John L. Mikesell, Sales Taxation: State and Local Structure
and Administration 16 (2d ed. 1994); Walter Hellerstein, Transaction Taxes and
Electronic Commerce: Designing State Taxes That Work in an Interstate Environment,

50 Nat'l Tax J. 593, 596 (1997); Walter Hellerstein & Charles E. McClure, Jr., Sales
Taxation of Electronic Commerce. What John Due Knew All Along, 20 St. Tax Notes

41, 41-43 (2001).
114. Hellerstein, McIntyre & Pomp, supra note 21, at 78.
115. Jefferson Lines, 514 U.S. at 187.
116. See Hellerstein, Is "Internal Consistency" Foolish?, supra note 1, at 172-73;
John A. Swain, Cybertaxation and the Commerce Clause: Entity Isolation or Affiliate

Nexus, 75 S.Cal. L. Rev. 419, 427 (2002).
117. See, e.g., Jefferson Lines, 514 U.S. at 183; Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504
U.S. 298, 310 (1992); Trinova Corp. v. Mich. Dep't of Treasury, 498 U.S. 358, 372-73
(1991); Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 259 n.11 (1989); Am. Trucking Ass'ns v.
Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266, 295 (1987); Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S.
609, 615-16 (1981); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Comm'r of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 443 (1980);
Dep't of Revenue v. Ass'n of Wash. Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S. 734, 750 (1978).
118. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977); see also
Hellerstein, McIntyre & Pomp, supra note 21, at 49.
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goods and services. Although the precise language varies from state
to state, use taxes are generally imposed on the "storage, use, or other
consumption in this state" of most goods (and some services)
purchased at retail."9 And every state that imposes a use tax offers a
credit for sales taxes that have already been paid on the purchase of
the same goods or services.'
Providing a credit against the use tax
for sales taxes paid on the same item-that is, making the sales tax
and the use tax perfect complements-is incomprehensible unless the
sales tax, too, is a tax on the "storage, use, or consumption in this
state" of the goods or services subject to the tax. The only difference
is that the sales tax is collected at the time of sale by the seller
(whether it is nominally imposed on the purchaser or the seller), while
the use tax is remitted by the taxpayer herself some time after the
purchase.
Because retail sales and use taxes are best understood as levies on
the consumption of the purchased goods or services, a rigorous
application of the fair apportionment test would require a division of
the measure (i.e., the purchase price) when goods or services were
consumed in more than one state.
Such apportionment is
theoretically possible.121 Imagine the purchase of a consumer durable
good, such as a computer, at a retail store in California. The sales tax
imposed on the purchase will be approximately eight percent,' and
the measure will be the item's full retail price. Thus, if the retail price
of the computer were $2000, the purchaser would pay a tax of $160 at
the moment of sale, and the vendor would remit this amount to the
state. At the time of purchase, it is unknown (even by the purchaser)
where the good will ultimately be used for its full useful life. Absent
evidence to the contrary, it seems reasonable to assume that the item
will be used in the state of purchase, thus justifying a tax on its full
retail price-the unapportioned value of the purchaser's potential
consumption.
Suppose, however, that the taxpayer moves to Arizona six months
after purchasing the computer, and suppose that the value of the
computer when she moves is $1500.
To achieve a proper
apportionment of the tax, two things would have to occur. First,
California would need to refund the tax previously imposed on the
value of the computer that, in hindsight, was not consumed in
California. Here, California would owe the taxpayer eight percent of
$1500, or $120, because this is the tax that was imposed at the time of
119. Cal. Rev. & Tax Code § 6201 (West 1998); see also Hellerstein, Is "Internal
Consistency" Foolish?, supra note 1, at 159.
120. See Hellerstein & Hellerstein, supra note 109, 18.08[1].
121. See Hellerstein, McIntyre & Pomp, supra note 21, at 78-79.
122. The actual sales tax rate in California depends on the county in which the
good is purchased, and ranges from 7.25% in several counties to 8.50% in San
Francisco. See Cal. State Bd. of Equalization, California City and County Sales and
Use Tax Rates, at http://www.boe.ca.gov/sutax/pam71.htm (last visited Aug. 28, 2002).
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sale on the mistaken assumption that the computer would be fully
consumed in California. Second, the taxpayer would have to pay a
use tax to Arizona, with the measure being the remaining value of the
computer, i.e., $1500. If Arizona imposes a statewide use tax of23 six
percent, the taxpayer would be required to remit $90 to the state. 1
Setting theoretical possibilities aside, however, such a system would
be an administrative nightmare. 124 First, taxpayers and state tax
administrators would have to assess the value of every good or service
subjected to the sales and use tax that was only partially consumed in
the state of purchase. This would require large amounts of time, and
without a market transaction generating a sales price, the value would
often be difficult to discern. Taxpayers would predictably tend to
overstate the remaining value of the items in their reports to the state
of purchase, placing a large burden on states to verify the validity of
rebate claims. Second, the system would rely on taxpayers themselves
to report to the second state the value of the goods they have brought
there to use and consume. If the present rates of reporting and
remittance with respect to self-assessed use taxes are any indication, 125
compliance would be minimal to nonexistent. Perhaps states could
establish protocols by which a request for a rebate from the first state
would be reported to the second state, thus alerting that state to the
presence and value of the goods. But creating such a system, not to
mention effectively enforcing it, would require an enormous
investment of resources.
It is these pragmatic considerations that best explain why the
Supreme Court has never required the apportionment of retail sales
and use taxes. 126 As the Court conceded in Jefferson Lines, it has
consistently approved taxation of sales without any division of the
tax base among different States, and ha[s] instead held such taxes
properly measurable by the gross charge for the purchase, regardless
of any activity outside the taxing jurisdiction
that might have
127
preceded the sale or might occur in the future.

123. For a similar example, see Hellerstein, McIntyre & Pomp, supra note 21, at 79.
124. See id. (calling such a system "administratively cumbersome"); see also Jesse
H. Choper & Tung Yin, State Taxation and the Dormant Commerce Clause: The
Object-Measure Approach, 1998 Sup. Ct. Rev. 193, 237-38 (discussing the
impracticality of apportioning sales taxes).
125. See William F. Fox et al., Issues in the Design and Implementation of
Production and Consumption VA Ts for the American States, 23 St. Tax Notes 205, 206
(2002) (describing how "use tax compliance is essentially nonexistent for individuals
and is thought to be low for businesses").
126. See Hellerstein, McIntyre & Pomp, supra note 21, at 79-80; Walter
Hellerstein, State Taxation of Interstate Business and the Supreme Court, 1974 Term:
Standard Pressed Steel and Colonial Pipeline, 62 Va. L. Rev. 149, 172-73 (1976)
[hereinafter Hellerstein, Standard Pressed Steel and Colonial Pipeline].
127. Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175,186 (1995).
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Requiring true apportionment would render retail sales and use taxes
virtually impossible to administer, at least given present technology.
Moreover, forcing states to abandon these taxes would substantially
undermine states' fiscal authority. In fiscal year 2000, general retail
sales and use taxes constituted 32.5% of state tax receipts, second in
importance only to personal income taxes (which constituted 37.0% of
state tax revenues). 128 If one adds to this total the state excise taxes
that also operate as taxes on consumption (such as taxes on motor
vehicle fuels, alcohol, and tobacco products), the figure is 40.1%.129
Simply put, states (as they are presently configured) could not survive
without these taxes, at least without a long period of transition. Thus,
conceptual rigor in the application of the fair apportionment test has
given way to real world, pragmatic concerns about the fiscal health of
state governments.
Jefferson Lines was arguably the atypical case in which apportioning
the sales tax measure was actually feasible. In fact, the Court
conceded as much, stating that, unlike the telecommunications tax in
Goldberg, "no comparable barriers [to apportionment] exist here."' 130
But the Court decided that maintaining consistency in its treatment of
sales and use taxes as a group made more sense than creating an
exception for those circumstances where apportionment was
technically feasible. The Court found "no reason to leave the line of
longstanding precedent and lose the simplicity of our general rule
sustaining sales taxes measured by full value, simply to carve out an
exception for the subcategory" of cases where division of the tax base
was possible,' and this judgment seems defensible. Because the
Court had previously held that sales and use taxes are generally
exempt from the rule of apportionment, overarching conceptual
coherence had already been sacrificed. Moreover, the marginal gain
in theoretical coherence achieved by requiring apportionment in a
small subset of sales tax cases is arguably outweighed by the loss of
simplicity inherent in the rule that sales and use taxes, as a class, need
not be apportioned.
In any event, the larger point remains: D.H. Holmes, Goldberg, and
Jefferson Lines are only understandable as approving, under certain
conditions, the imposition of completely unapportioned taxes on
interstate commerce. 32 They stand for the principle that if a state tax
scheme otherwise protects interstate commerce from multiple
128. Hellerstein & Hellerstein, supra note 3, at 6.
129. Id.
130. Jefferson Lines, 514 U.S. at 195.
131. Id. at 196.
132. Cf.Hellerstein, Standard Pressed Steel and Colonial Pipeline, supra note 126,
at 171 (making a similar point with respect to the Supreme Court's decisions
addressing gross receipts taxes imposed on business activities, such as manufacturing
and wholesaling).
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taxation, and the apportionment of the tax in question (or the class of
taxes of which it is a part) "would produce insurmountable
administrative and technological barriers,"'33 the tax will be
constitutional despite the absence of apportionment. As the Court
noted parenthetically in Goldberg, "apportionment does not require
[a] State to adopt a tax which would 'pose genuine administrative
burdens." 134
It therefore seems odd to speak of fair apportionment as a
constitutional "requirement." Fair apportionment cannot truly be
required by the Constitution if taxes imposed on interstate commerce
can be constitutional without being fairly apportioned. Instead, fair
apportionment-at least as the Court has applied the concept-is
better understood as a constitutional preference. It is the preferred
means for states to prevent multiple taxation and extraterritorial
taxation. Thus, where fair apportionment is practically feasible, such
as in the imposition of a corporate income tax, states must apportion
the value they seek to tax. But when dividing the tax base would
impose genuine administrative burdens, such as in the implementation
of retail sales and use taxes, apportionment is unnecessary, provided
the state takes other steps to protect interstate commerce from
discrimination.
III. THE PERMISSIBILITY OF EXTRATERRITORIAL STATE TAXATION
This understanding of fair apportionment- as a constitutional
preference rather than a requirement -reveals something significant
about the nature of state taxing authority within our system of
federalism. When a state imposes an unapportioned tax on interstate
commerce, it taxes activity occurring outside its borders, as an
unapportioned tax on interstate activity necessarily reaches values
attributable to other states. This means that, despite the Supreme
Court's many statements to the contrary-and despite traditional
conceptions of the breadth of state sovereignty-extraterritorial state
taxation is sometimes permissible. This insight is important, for as
commercial activity increasingly occurs in "places" that are not tied to
any physical location, states will inevitably encounter difficulties in
taxing such activity without projecting their taxing powers beyond
their borders. And states are apt to need the authority to tax such
activity, both to protect their tax bases from steady erosion and to
ensure that different forms of commerce are taxed evenhandedly. In
assessing the constitutionality of such taxes, then, we should be
cognizant that the "fundamental" principle that the Constitution
prohibits extraterritorial state taxation is not steadfast. In truth, the
Court's approach to issues of extraterritoriality in state taxation has
133. Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 264-65 (1989).
134. Id. at 265 (quoting Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266, 296 (1987)).
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been flexible, and this flexibility may be crucial to states' capacity to
devise practical ways of ensuring that interstate commerce continues
to shoulder its fair share of state tax burdens.135
As noted earlier, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that "a
State may not tax value earned outside its borders."' 36 This
prohibition on extraterritorial taxation is grounded in both the
Commerce Clause and the Due Process Clause, and it extends to all

forms of taxation. For instance, in the 1937 decision of Great Atlantic
& Pacific Tea Co. v. Grosjean,37 the Court explained that a "state may
not tax real property or tangible personal property lying outside her
borders; nor may she lay an excise or privilege tax upon the exercise
or enjoyment of a right or privilege in another state derived from the
laws of that state and therein exercised and enjoyed."' 38 More
recently, the Court stated in Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax
Board139 that "[u]nder both the Due Process and the Commerce
Clauses of the Constitution, a State may not, when imposing an
income-based tax, 'tax value earned outside its borders."" 4 And in
the 1991 case of Trinova Corp. v. Michigan Departmentof Treasury,4 '
Justice Scalia phrased the question presented as whether Michigan's
value-added tax on business activity "violates the Due Process Clause
135. Cf. W. Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 254 (1938) ("It was not
the purpose of the commerce clause to relieve those engaged in interstate commerce
from their just share of state tax burden[s] even though it increases the cost of doing
business."); Postal Tel.-Cable Co. v. Richmond, 249 U.S. 252, 259 (1919) ("Even
interstate business must pay its way.").
136. ASARCO, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 458 U.S. 307, 315 (1982); see also
Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 164 (1983); Exxon Corp.
v. Wis. Dep't of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207, 221 (1980); McLeod v. J.E. Dilworth Co., 322
U.S. 327, 330 (1944); Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 315 U.S. 501, 507 (1942); Conn. Gen.
Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77, 80-81 (1938); Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. North
Carolina, 297 U.S. 682, 686 (1936). As Professor Hartman pointed out, the Court
"imposed territorial limitations on the power of a state to tax" even before the
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. Paul J. Hartman, State Taxation of
CorporateIncome from a Multistate Business, 13 Vand. L. Rev. 21, 31 n.31 (1959)
(citing Case of State Tax on Foreign-held Bonds, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 300 (1872), R.R.
Co. v. Jackson, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 262 (1868), and Hays v. The Pac. Mail S.S. Co., 58
U.S. (17 How.) 596 (1854)).
137. 301 U.S. 412 (1937).
138. Id. at 424; see also Conn. Gen. Life Ins., 303 U.S. at 80-81 ("[A] State which
controls the property and activities within its boundaries of a foreign corporation
admitted to do business there may tax them. But the due process clause denies to the
State power to tax or regulate the corporation's property and activities elsewhere.").
139. 463 U.S. 159 (1983).
140. Id. at 164 (quoting ASARCO, 458 U.S. at 315). As one commentator has
explained, "[t]he basic proposition can be simply stated: At least as far as
nondomiciliary corporations are concerned, a state may only tax income arising from
sources within the state. Or, put differently, it cannot give its income tax
extraterritorial effect." E. George Rudolph, State Taxation of Interstate Business: The
Unitary Business Concept and Affiliated Corporate Groups, 25 Tax L. Rev. 171, 181
(1970).
141. 498 U.S. 358 (1991).
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by taxing extraterritorial values."' 42
As Justice Stevens has
summarized the principle, "[iut is fundamental that a State' 143has no
power to impose a tax on income earned outside of the State.'

This prohibition on extraterritorial taxation reflects a basic
understanding of the structure of federalism established by the
Constitution. While the federal government has the authority to
regulate conduct throughout the nation, states generally can regulate
only that activity occurring within their borders or which produces

harmful local effects. 144 As the Court concisely stated in the 1905 case
of Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky,

45

"the operation of

state laws [is] limited to persons or property within the boundaries of
the State.' 1 46 The Constitution contains several specific provisions
that support this constraint on state authority.147 Probably the best
142. Id. at 387.
143. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Comm'r of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 451 (1980) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
144. See 1 Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 6-8, at 1074 (3d ed.
2000) (stating that "the Court has articulated virtually a per se rule of invalidity for
extraterritorial state regulations-i.e., laws which directly regulate out-of-state
commerce, or laws whose operation is triggered by out-of-state events"); Jack L.
Goldsmith & Alan 0. Sykes, The Internet and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 110
Yale L.J. 785, 790 (2001) ("Scores of state laws validly apply to and regulate
extrastate commercial conduct that produces harmful local effects."). There is a lively
debate as to the degree to which (if at all) a state can regulate the conduct of its own
citizens taking place outside the state's borders. Compare Mark D. Rosen,
Extraterritorialityand Political Heterogeneity in American Federalism, 150 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 855 (2002), with Seth F. Kreimer, Lines in the Sand: The Importance of Borders
in American Federalism, 150 U. Pa. L. Rev. 973 (2002). This question, although quite
interesting, goes beyond the scope of my discussion here.
145. 199 U.S. 194 (1905).
146. Id. at 204; see also St. Louis Cotton Compress Co. v. Arkansas, 260 U.S. 346,
349 (1922) ("[T]he State may regulate the activities of foreign corporations within the
State but it cannot regulate or interfere with what they do outside."); N.Y. Life Ins.
Co. v. Head, 234 U.S. 149, 161 (1914) ("[I]t would be impossible to permit the statutes
of Missouri to operate beyond the jurisdiction of that State and in the State of New
York."); Bonaparte v. Tax Court, 104 U.S. 592, 594 (1881) ("No State can legislate
except with reference to its own jurisdiction.").
147. The Court has frequently cited the dormant Commerce Clause as the source
of this extraterritoriality principle. See, e.g., Healy v. Beer Inst., Inc., 491 U.S. 324, 337
(1989) (explaining that the dormant Commerce Clause prohibits a state from
"controlling commercial activity occurring wholly outside the boundary of the State");
Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 582 (1986)
(holding that state liquor price affirmation statute "regulates out-of-state transactions
in violation of the Commerce Clause"); Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, 294 U.S. 511, 521
(1935) (stating that the dormant Commerce Clause denies any state the "power to
project its legislation into [another state] by regulating the price to be paid in that
state"). The Supreme Court has also held that the Due Process and the Full Faith and
Credit Clauses restrain states' authority to regulate extraterritorially. See, e.g., Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 818 (1985) ("[T]he Due Process Clause and the
Full Faith and Credit Clause provide[] modest restrictions on the application of forum
law."); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co., 292 U.S. 143, 149
(1934) (noting that the Due Process Clause prevents a state from "extend[ing] the
effect of its laws beyond its borders so as to destroy or impair the right of citizens of
other states to make a contract not operative within its jurisdiction, and lawful where
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explanation, however, is that this "extraterritoriality principle" is
embedded in our constitutional design: it is inherent in the concept of
state sovereignty within our federal republic, "a structural inference
from our system as a whole."' 48
Regardless of the principle's precise source, it is well established
that the Constitution generally prohibits a state government from
"project[ing] its legislation into other States"'14 9 or "regulat[ing] outof-state transactions."' 5 ° Thus, "a statute that directly controls
commerce occurring wholly outside the boundaries of a State exceeds
the inherent limits of the enacting State's authority and is invalid."''
For instance, in the recent case of BMW of North America, Inc. v.
Gore,'52 the Supreme Court invalidated a state jury's punitive
damages award partly on the ground that the award was intended to
punish conduct by the defendant in other states.'53 The Court stated
that "principles of state sovereignty and comity" dictate that a state
cannot punish tortfeasors for lawful activity in other states; nor can a
state "impose sanctions on [a defendant] in order to deter conduct
that is lawful in other jurisdictions."' 54 As the Court explained the
idea in Healy v. Beer Institute, Inc.,"' "[t]he limits on a State's power
to enact substantive legislation are similar to the limits on the
jurisdiction of state courts. In either case, 'any attempt "directly" to
assert extraterritorial jurisdiction over persons or property would
offend sister States and exceed the inherent limits of the State's
power."" 56
Unapportioned taxes on interstate commercial activity, however,
contravene this extraterritoriality principle, as they directly regulate
activity that takes place in other states. Consider, again, the previous
discussions of Goldberg and Jefferson Lines.'57 In Goldberg, the
Illinois Telecommunications Excise Tax reached the full value of
interstate telecommunications, even though a portion of the activity
being taxed took place in other states. By taxing the out-of-state
share of an interstate call, Illinois was "assert[ing] extraterritorial

made"). For more comprehensive discussions, see Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note
144, at 789-90, and Donald H. Regan, Siamese Essays: (I) CTS Corp. v. Dynamics
Corp of America and Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine; (11) ExtraterritorialState
Legislation, 85 Mich. L. Rev. 1865, 1884-85 (1987).
148. Regan, supra note 147, at 1895.
149. Brown-FormanDistillers,476 U.S. at 583 (internal quotation marks omitted).
150. Id. at 582.
151. Healy, 491 U.S. at 336.

152. 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
153. Id. at 572-74.
154. Id. at 572-73.

155. 491 U.S. 324.
156. Id. at 336 n.13 (quoting Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 643 (1982)
(plurality opinion) (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 197 (1977))).
157. See supra text accompanying notes 73-112.
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jurisdiction" over activity that occurred in other states.'58 Similarly,
Oklahoma's tax on the full retail price of interstate bus travel at issue
in Jefferson Lines reached the consumption of services provided
outside the state's borders. For instance, when Oklahoma taxed the
value of the Kansas portion of a Tulsa-to-Lawrence bus ticket, it was
"project[ing] its legislation into other States" and "regulat[ing] out-of'
state transactions."159
Indeed, the same is true of all retail sales taxes
imposed on goods or services consumed in more than one state.
Recall the earlier example of the computer purchased in California
but consumed partly in California and partly in Arizona."6° By
imposing a sales tax on the full, unapportioned retail price of the
computer at the time of purchase (and not offering a rebate when the
purchaser moves to Arizona), California is effectively taxing activity
that occurs outside the state, i.e., the value of consumption taking
place in Arizona.
Thus, just as the fair apportionment requirement is not truly a
requirement, the prohibition on extraterritorial state taxation is not
truly a prohibition. To be sure, the general rule, applicable in the run
of cases, is that states may not tax extraterritorial values. But the
Court's decisions have eschewed a rigid application of this principle,
preferring an approach that is flexible and pragmatic. Because states
would effectively be incapable of imposing sales taxes (or other taxes
that resemble them) if the Constitution rigidly required them to divide
the sales and use tax base, the Court has permitted such taxes without
fair apportionment. And in doing so, the Court has necessarily
allowed states to engage in some measure of extraterritorial taxation.
Where apportioning the tax base "would produce insurmountable
administrative and technological barriers" or "'pose genuine
administrative burdens,'''161 and the state's tax scheme otherwise

protects interstate commerce from discrimination, states may project
their taxing powers beyond their borders. In the Court's practical
calculus, the states' need to preserve a critical means for collecting
revenue has trumped a rigorous application of the ban on
extraterritorial taxation.
This understanding of the extraterritoriality principle has important
implications for the future of state taxation, particularly with respect
to the imposition of levies that resemble retail sales taxes. It is hardly
news that an increasing share of interstate commercial activity
involves the delivery of electronic goods and services, often to
"places" lacking any clear geographic location. For instance, a typical
158. Healy, 491 U.S. at 336 n.13.
159. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 582-

83 (1986).
160. See supra text accompanying notes 122-23.
161. Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 264-65 (1989) (quoting Am. Trucking Ass'ns
v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266,296 (1987)).
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transaction might involve the delivery of digitized information-text,
video, audio, or other content-from a seller's computer to a
purchaser's computer via the Internet.162 The purchaser's computer
might well be mobile-a laptop or handheld computer, a personal
digital assistant ("PDA"), or a web-enabled phone-lacking any fixed
location and used by the purchaser wherever she travels. Moreover,
the purchaser, instead of downloading the information to her own
device, might have it delivered to an account stored on a third party's
computer (for example, a "Yahoo briefcase"), which she could then
access via the internet using her mobile device (or any other
computer). Further, rather than purchasing the information itself, the
consumer might purchase a subscription service that permits her to
access a database or other store of proprietary material at any time
and from any location.
The practical challenges faced by state governments in applying
their sales or use taxes to such transactions are daunting. Most
significantly, the solution thus far employed by states (and approved
by the Court 63 ) for retail sales taxes-permitting the state of purchase
to impose an unapportioned tax on the full sales price of the good or
service-faces a large problem. Specifically, it may be impossible to
164
determine where these goods or services are actually purchased.
The general rule, followed by almost every state, is that sales
transactions are taxed by the jurisdiction in which the goods or
services are delivered.'65 This is a logical outgrowth of the sales tax
being a levy on the value of consumption by the purchaser: the state in
which the purchaser is located is permitted to tax the full value of the
good based on the assumption that the good will be consumed in that
state. 16 6 When a purchaser downloads a file or accesses a database via
the Internet, however, it may be impossible for the seller to discern
the physical location of the purchaser, especially when the purchaser
uses a mobile device. 67 And if the seller cannot determine the
162. See Hellerstein, State Taxation of Electronic Commerce, supra note 9, at 42831.
163. See Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 186 (1995) ("We
have ...consistently approved taxation of sales without any division of the tax base
among different States.... ."); Hellerstein, Is "Internal Consistency" Foolish?, supra
note 1, at 173-74; see also Peters, supra note 1, at 108.
164. See Hellerstein, State Taxation of Electronic Commerce, supra note 9, at 475.
165. See Martin I. Eisenstein, The Constitutional Limits on Sales Taxation of
Cyberspace, 12 St. Tax Notes 601, 603 (1997); Donald M. Griswold & Michael N.
McLoughlin, Applying the Commerce Clause to Electronic Commerce, 17 St. Tax
Notes 757, 760 (1999); Hellerstein, State Taxation of Electronic Commerce, supra note
9, at 471.
166. See Hellerstein, State Taxation of Electronic Commerce, supra note 9, at 472.
167. See Arthur Angstreich, James R. Fisher & Eric J. Miethke, Jefferson Lines as
the Ticket to Cyberspace? A Proposal for the Taxation of Electronic Commerce
Services, 14 St. Tax Notes 1993, 1995 (1998); Eisenstein, supra note 165, at 604;
Griswold & McLoughlin, supra note 165, at 760; Ada Ko, A National Sales Tax after
Quill? A Proposalfor State and Local Taxation of the Sales of Goods and Services on
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purchaser's location, state governments-which rely on sellers to
collect and remit the tax-will lack the information as well.
Consequently, even if the state of purchase were permitted to tax the
full value of the transaction, it would probably lack any means of
actually enforcing the tax.
The most practicable solution might be to deem the tax situs of such
transactions to be the purchaser's state of residence and allow that
state to tax the transaction in full.'68 Here, state of residence could
mean (a) the state of the purchaser's billing address, which might be
available through the purchaser's credit card information; (b) the
location where the purchaser primarily uses her computer, which
might be solicited by the seller or registered with the purchaser's
internet service provider; or (c) for business-related purchases, a
registered business address. 16 9 No doubt, such a compromise would
often allow the "wrong" state to tax the transaction, as the taxed
goods or services would frequently be consumed partly or even
entirely in other states. But this might be the only administratively
feasible solution, 7 ° and permitting states to apply their sales and use
taxes to such transactions could be critical to preserving their fiscal
authority in the twenty-first century. Shielding these forms of
commerce from state and local taxation might lead to a substantial
erosion of the sales and use tax base, and it could force states to treat
certain forms of commerce more favorably than others, distorting
economic decisions in a manner that violates basic norms of sound tax
policy.' 7'
the Internet, 17 St. Tax Notes 53, 55 (1999).
168. If the seller is in State A and the purchaser in State B, the "sale" itself may
legally occur in State A. Thus, the tax imposed by State B would technically be a use
tax rather than a sales tax. See Hellerstein, State Taxation of Electronic Commerce,
supra note 9, at 473; Swain, supra note 116, at 427-28. This is merely a semantic
difference, however. Assuming State B has jurisdiction over the seller, it can require
the seller to collect a use tax on the value of the item sold the same as if it were
imposing a sales tax.
169. The Drafting Committee of the National Tax Association Communications
and Electronic Commerce Tax Project has proposed a similar solution. See James
Eads et al., National Tax Association Communications and Electronic Commerce Tax
Project Report No. 1 of the Drafting Committee, 13 St. Tax Notes 1255, 1264-65
(1997); see also Hellerstein, State Taxation of Electronic Commerce, supra note 9, at
487-92 (making a similar proposal).
170. It might also be administratively feasible to allow the state in which the seller
is located to tax the value of the transaction in full. But such a solution would be
inconsistent with the underlying purpose of the sales tax as a levy on personal
consumption, as the consumption is much more likely to take place in the state of the
consumer's residence than where the seller is located. More practically, this solution
might well be susceptible to massive evasion: sellers of electronic content could simply
locate their computers that deliver such content in states that decline to tax these
transactions. See Hellerstein, State Taxation of Electronic Commerce, supra note 9, at
487 ("If the server's presence is relevant, Oregon (a state with no sales tax) will soon
become the server capital of the world ....
").
171. See David Brunori, State Tax Policy: A Political Perspective 17-19 (2001).
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Most important for present purposes, allowing the purchaser's state
of residence (however defined) to tax the full value of these
transactions would clearly allow states to project their taxing powers
beyond their borders. First, as with the application of any retail sales
tax, the state of residence would be taxing extraterritorial values
whenever the taxed good or service is consumed in more than one
state.
Second, the state of residence would often be taxing
transactions when none of the relevant activity occurred within that
state. For example, suppose a resident of State A purchases a
digitized audio file from a company in State B, downloading the file to
her computer and consuming it entirely in State C. State A essentially
has no connection to the transaction, as the purchase and
consumption of the item occur entirely in other states. Yet if the sale
were deemed to occur in the purchaser's state of residence, State A
would impose a sales tax on the full value of the transaction. It would
not just be taxing more than its fair share; it would be taxing the full
retail price of the item when it is fairly entitled to no share.
If states could never "tax value earned outside [their] borders," as
the Supreme Court has often stated,'72 a tax applied in this fashion
would plainly be unconstitutional. But Goldberg and Jefferson Lines
demonstrate that the extraterritoriality principle in state taxation is
not so rigid. As the Court stated in Goldberg, "[i]t should not be
overlooked.., that the external consistency test is essentially a
practicalinquiry."' 73 And if the external consistency test is essentially
a practical inquiry, so, too, must be the criteria of fair apportionment
and extraterritoriality. Thus, if deeming the situs of these sorts of
transactions to be the purchaser's state of residence were the only
practicable means available for states to reach these types of
transactions with their sales and use taxes, it should not be
unconstitutional solely because it results in extraterritorial taxation.
As in Goldberg, this may be "a realistic legislative solution to the
'
technology of the present-day telecommunications industry."174
172. See, e.g., ASARCO, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 458 U.S. 307, 315 (1982).
173. Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 264 (1989) (emphasis added).
174. Id. at 265; see also Arthur R. Rosen & Alysse Grossman, Coping with
Electronic Commerce Today, 14 St. Tax Notes 463, 468 (1998) ("By virtue of the
Court's language in Goldberg, it is clear that the Court supports the evolution of the
taxing system to accommodate new technology."). Cf. Walter Hellerstein,
Deconstructing the Debate over State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, 13 Harv. J. L.
& Tech. 549, 553 (2000) [hereinafter Hellerstein, Deconstructing the Debate]
("[W]hile nexus rules are clearly necessary in the existing environment, and may well
be necessary to protect the small business even in a utopian future characterized by
greater uniformity among the states in their sales tax regimes, the debate should focus
on rules that are appropriate to the twenty-first century, not the nineteenth.").
This is not to say that such a taxing scheme would necessarily be
constitutional. It might be that, while some measure of extraterritorial taxation is
tolerable, this solution opens the door too far, extending the doctrine's flexibility past
its breaking point. It may be that other solutions are practically feasible that would
allow states to tax most of these transactions without sanctioning such blatant forms
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It is instructive that Congress recently devised a very similar
solution
for the
state and local taxation
of mobile
telecommunications. Many state and local governments impose excise
taxes on telecommunications, levies that essentially operate as retail
sales or use taxes on the purchase of telecommunications services.175
(This was precisely the type of tax at issue in Goldberg.) The taxes
are typically imposed on the consumer, but the phone service provider
is obligated to collect and remit the tax to the state. As the use of
mobile phones has grown exponentially in recent years, states have
found it increasingly difficult to apply these taxes to wireless
telecommunications. 76
First, it can be quite cumbersome and
expensive (although technologically feasible) to determine where each
call originates and terminates. 77 Second, it is increasingly common
for phone service providers to sell "flat rate" plans, under which
customers pay a flat amount per month for a certain number of
transmission minutes, regardless of where calls originate or
terminate. 78 The prevalence of such calling plans makes the process
of apportioning customer charges based on the location of individual
calls even more complex.
In the Mobile Telecommunications Sourcing Act of 2000,179
Congress crafted a practical solution to these problems. Under the
Act, mobile telecommunications may be taxed by the state and
locality "whose territorial limits encompass the customer's place of
primary use, regardless of where the mobile telecommunication
services originate, terminate, or pass through."' 80 The Act defines the
customer's "place of primary use" as "the street address
representative of where the customer's use of the mobile
telecommunications service primarily occurs," and this address must
of extraterritorial taxation. Regardless, it should be evident that this sort of taxing
system is not unconstitutional simply because it permits states to project their taxing
powers beyond their borders. Goldberg and Jefferson Lines make clear that
extraterritorial taxation is not strictly forbidden, specifically when states would
otherwise be left without any practicable means of taxing a significant segment of
interstate commercial activity.
175. See Robert Cline, Telecommunications Taxes: 50-State Estimates of Excess
State and Local Tax Burden, 24 St. Tax Notes 931, 940-41 (2002) (table showing
revenue raised in 1999 by state and local sales and use taxes imposed on
telecommunications); see also S. Rep. No. 106-326, at 1 (2000), available at
http://thomas.loc.gov; H. R. Rep. No, 106-719, at 7 (2000), available at
http://thomas.loc.gov; Hellerstein, State Taxation of Electronic Commerce, supra note
9, at 463.
176. See S. Rep. No. 106-326, at 1-2 (2000), available at http://thomas.loc.gov.
177. See id.; Wireless Telecommunications Sourcing and Privacy Act: Hearings on
H.R. 3489 Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Trade and Consumer
Protection of the House Comm. on Commerce, 106th Cong. (2000) (testimony of Dan
R. Bucks, Executive Director, Multistate Tax Commission), 2000 WL 374445.
178. See S. Rep. No. 106-326, at 2 (2000), available at http://thomas.loc.gov.
179. Pub. L. No. 106-252, 114 Stat. 626 (2000), available at http://thomas.loc.gov.
180. 4 U.S.C. § 117(b) (2000).
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be either "the residential street address or the primary business street
address of the customer."18 ' Conversely, no state or locality other
than those that encompass the customer's place of primary use "may
impose taxes, charges, or fees on charges for such mobile
'
telecommunications services."182
This uniform sourcing rule greatly
simplifies the task of assessing taxes on these transactions, both for
phone service providers and for state and local tax authorities." 3 It
also effectively eliminates the risk that interstate calls will be subject
to multiple taxation, and it ensures that wireless telecommunications
will not be undertaxed (at least in aggregate) due to practical barriers
of administrability in enforcement.1 84
The Act plainly authorizes states to impose extraterritorial taxes.
Suppose a Washington resident travels to Oregon and places a call to
New York City with her wireless phone. The Act authorizes
Washington to tax the full retail price of the telecommunication, and
it forbids Oregon or New York from taxing any portion of it. But
Washington's only connection to the transaction is as the state in
which the customer contracts with her phone service provider, an
arrangement that allows her subsequently to make the out-of-state
call. As discussed earlier (and reinforced by the Court's analysis in
Goldberg), a telecommunications excise tax is best understood as a tax
on the value of the customer's consumption of the service. Here, all
of the customer's consumption takes place outside the state-in
Oregon and New York. None of the consumption takes place in
Washington.
Yet the Act entitles Washington to impose an
unapportioned tax on the full retail value of the call. By doing so, it
empowers Washington to project its taxing power beyond its borders,
to tax value that is entirely attributable to other states.
Because the Mobile Telecommunications Sourcing Act is an act of
Congress, the dormant Commerce Clause is irrelevant in assessing
whether state and local taxes imposed pursuant the Act's provisions
are unconstitutional.'85 The dormant Commerce Clause is no more
181. 4 U.S.C. § 124(8)-(8)(a) (2000).

182. 4 U.S.C. § 117(b).

183. See Kevin P. Thompson, Prospects Grow Dim: 106th Congress Will Resolve the
Thorniest Issues in Internet Taxation Debate, PLI Order No. JO-003J, at 145 (MarchApril 2001), WL 491 PLI/Tax 133.
184. In individual cases, of course, this solution will produce both undertaxation
and overtaxation. If the caller's primary place of use is located in a state that does not
tax telecommunications, all of her calls will go completely untaxed, even when the
state in which a call originates or terminates taxes such telecommunications.
Conversely, if the caller's primary place of use is located in a state that taxes such
calls, all of her calls will be taxed in full, even when the state of origination or
destination imposes no telecommunications tax.
Indeed, undertaxation or
overtaxation will occur in each instance that the state of the caller's primary place of
use taxes such a telecommunication at a rate that differs from the rate imposed by the
state of the call's origination or destination.
185. See Hellerstein, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, supra note 9, at 503-04.
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than a negative inference, and when Congress invokes its commerce
power to address the issue in question, there is no longer a negative
inference to be drawn.'86 But the extraterritoriality principle is not
grounded exclusively in the dormant Commerce Clause. Again, the
Court has stated several times that the Due Process Clause prohibits
'
states from "tax[ing] value earned outside [their] borders."187
Moreover, the basic principle that "[n]o state can legislate except with
reference to its own jurisdiction"'88 is probably best understood as
inherent in the structure of Our Federalism.8 9 Thus, state taxes
imposed on mobile telecommunications that reach transactions
occurring in other states may still pose some difficult constitutional
questions. 9 °

The crucial point is that, in answering these questions and others
like them, we must be mindful that state taxes are not unconstitutional
simply because they reach extraterritorial values. Rather, where a
state would face "genuine administrative burdens" in taxing a
particular form of commerce without projecting its taxing authority
beyond its borders, and the tax scheme at issue protects interstate
commerce from discrimination, a state may tax commercial activity
occurring in other states. Furthermore, this rule represents a sensible
accommodation of the competing constitutional values at stake, the
Court's frequent statements that "a State may not tax value earned

186. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 171 (1992) ("While the
Commerce Clause has long been understood to limit States' ability to discriminate
against interstate commerce, . . . that limit may be lifted ...by an expression of the
'unambiguous intent' of Congress." (quoting Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437,
458 (1992)); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 425 (1946) (stating that
"whenever Congress' judgment has been uttered affirmatively to contradict the
Court's previously expressed view that specific action taken by the states in Congress'
silence was forbidden by the commerce clause, this body has accommodated its
previous judgment to Congress' expressed approval").
187. Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 164 (1983)
(quoting ASARCO, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 458 U.S. 307, 315 (1982)); see
also Hunt-Wesson, Inc. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 528 U.S. 458, 464 (2000) (stating that
the Due Process Clause prohibits taxation of activity "unless there is a 'minimal
connection' or 'nexus' between such activities and the taxing State, and a rational
relationship between the [value] attributed to the State and the intrastate values of
the enterprise") (internal quotation marks omitted); Trinova Corp. v. Mich. Dep't of
Treasury, 498 U.S. 358, 394 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that
"extraterritorial taxation violates basic principles of due process").
188. Bonaparte v. Tax Court, 104 U.S. 592,594 (1881).
189. See Regan, supra note 147, at 1895; supra text accompanying notes 137-41.
190. See Hellerstein, Deconstructing the Debate, supra note 174, at 564-65; see also
id. at 565 n.63 (quoting from Interstate Sales Tax Collection Act of 1987 and the Equity
in Interstate Competition Act of 1987: Hearings on H.R. 1242, H.R. 1891, and H.R.
3521 Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the House
Judiciary Comm., 100th Cong. (1989) (letter from Donald H. Regan, Professor,
University of Michigan School of Law, regarding the "Constitutionality of H.R. 3521
and Similar Bills Authorizing States to Require Tax Collection by Mail-Order
Sellers")).
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outside its borders" notwithstanding. 9 ' As the Court's actual
decisions recognize (if only implicitly), it makes little sense to prohibit
every incarnation of extraterritorial taxation where doing so would
effectively deprive the states of the only practical means to taxing
various forms of interstate commercial activity. Whether grounded in
the dormant Commerce Clause, the Due Process Clause, or our
constitutional structure, the extraterritoriality principle should not
operate to prevent the states from "exacting from interstate
commerce its fair share of the cost of state government.' ' 192 Instead,
the prohibition on extraterritorial taxation must be balanced against
the states' need to maintain sound and effective systems for collecting
revenue. With such an understanding, we can better accommodate
the imperative of protecting interstate commerce from unfair taxation
while ensuring that the states continue to function as vital and
independent centers of governmental power.
CONCLUSION

Although the Supreme Court for many years has stated that state
taxes imposed on interstate commerce must "be fairly apportioned to
' the reality
reflect the [taxpayer's] business conducted in the State,"193
of the Court's decisions is a bit more complicated. Properly
understood, fair apportionment is a "second order" constitutional
value, a means to effectuate the "higher order" objectives of
preventing discrimination against interstate commerce and to ensure
that states have a sufficient nexus with the values they seek to tax. In
fact, as D.H. Holmes, Goldberg, and Jefferson Lines demonstrate, fair
apportionment is more of a preference than a constitutional
requirement. When a state's tax scheme otherwise protects interstate
commerce from discrimination, and it would be administratively
burdensome for the state to apportion the tax at issue (or the class of
taxes of which it is a part), states may impose completely
unapportioned levies on interstate commerce.
The most significant implication of this insight is that, contrary to
the "fundamental 1 194 principle that a state may not "project its powers
'
beyond its boundaries," 95
some degree of extraterritorial state
taxation is constitutionally permissible. To use the Court's words, the
191. ASARCO, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 458 U.S. 307,315 (1982).
192. Dep't of Revenue v. Ass'n of Wash. Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S. 734, 748
(1978).
193. Armco Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638, 644 (1984); see also Hellerstein, Is
"InternalConsistency" Foolish?,supra note 1, at 139 ("The Court has long interpreted

the commerce and due process clauses as requiring that taxes be fairly apportioned to
the taxpayer's activities in the taxing state.").
194. See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Comm'r of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 451 (1980) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) ("It is fundamental that a State has no power to impose a tax on income
earned outside of the State.").
195. McLeod v. J.E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327, 330 (1944).
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and local taxation calls for
extraterritoriality principle in 1state
"essentially a practical inquiry.' 96 As the landscape of commerce
evolves, becoming less and less tethered to traditional conceptions of
physical territoriality, this doctrinal flexibility and pragmatism will
likely become increasingly important. Understanding that not all
extraterritorial taxation is unconstitutional-that states have some
leeway to devise "realistic legislative solution[s]' 19 7 to the emerging
challenges posed by interstate commerce-may be critical to the
And protecting such
preservation of states' taxing authority.
remain the separate
the
states
ensure
that
help
in
turn,
will
authority,
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Constitution
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196. Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 264 (1989).
197. Id. at 265.
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